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Introduction 
 
“…psychology, because of its naturalism, had to miss entirely the 
accomplishment, the radical and genuine problem, of the life of the 
spirit…” 
Edmund Husserl, The Vienna Lecture, 1935 
One of the key decisions that social work has to make is whether it is 
based primarily within a psychological understanding of humanity, a 
sociological understanding or, as we will argue, a phenomenological one? 
We argue that phenomenology has remained undertheorized in 
understanding social work hitherto and offers a valuable method through 
which social work practitioners can understand the lived experience of 
practitioners and service users. Existing research emphasizes pre-
established norms and externally derived criteria when guiding social 
workers in practice. The more we look at how different theoretical 
understandings of social work aim to inform the practitioner in applying 
externally derived meaning to service users’ experiences, the more we 
come to believe that those understandings are superfluous. In fact, what is 
important is that the practitioner can make sense of the meanings that 
service users bring to their own experiences, for it is those meanings that 
will inform their actions, not externally imposed ones.  
There is no space to explore the philosophical gulf between the analytic 
and pragmatic traditions of North America and the UK, and the European 
continental traditions here, but it is to the latter tradition that this paper 
belongs. It especially picks up the thread of phenomenology that links 
Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, sequential but overlapping 
theorists in the continental tradition. However, each move forward from 
Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology with its focus on ‘intentionality’, 
‘eidetic reduction’ and the ‘constitution of meaning’, through Heidegger’s 
existential phenomenology with its focus on the ‘lived experience’ and 
‘ontology’ and on towards Merleau-Ponty’s focus on ‘embodiment.’ In 
describing the development of phenomenological thought in this way we 
aim to orient the reader towards the general tradition of phenomenology 
which is a fundamental departure away from the limited ontical fields of 
psychology and sociology.  
Edmund Husserl (1982; 1990), the founder of phenomenology, argues that 
the natural attitude, that is our unthinking prejudices and natural beliefs in 
the existence of the world, as it is taken-for-granted, needs to be 
suspended to discern the phenomenological attitude, and understand the 
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world without bias, assumption, or predisposition. The driving purpose of 
phenomenological reflection requires the transformation of our mundane 
and banal experience of the world. The impact of this phenomenological 
epoché (bracketing) is that it allows us to grasp the concrete world which 
we inhabit not as this or that position, not as emergent from a diversity of 
opinion, not through taken-for-granted beliefs and assumptions but 
instead as meaning-laden phenomenon. Glimpsing into the lived 
experience of our service users while bracketing off our prior assumptions 
seems to us to be the job of the social worker and is necessarily 
phenomenological. As Husserl suggests, the purpose of bracketing, is to 
suspend our belief in the things we take for granted, or our natural belief 
in what we presuppose to be an objective world.  The consequence of 
bracketing, for Husserl, is that inquiry may focus more sharply on clear and 
fundamental evidence irrespective of our natural predilections (Husserl, 
1990). This is an essential activity to the social worker as practical 
researcher. Meeting with a plurality of clients means the social worker is 
naturally embedded in a variety of cultural and social indicators, social 
prejudices, media inflections, which need to be set aside to see the real 
lived experience of clients.  Berger and Luckmann (1966) drew upon 
phenomenological philosophy to posit their ideas about social 
construction which helps us to recognise that subjects need to be 
understood in contexts and to see the importance of interdependence 
with the social and political cultures in which they (and we) live. This is 
essential, however we propose that supplementing this type of analysis 
with insights gleaned directly from phenomenology, offers the added 
benefit, of not seeing clients as just their contexts.  
 
While phenomenology is increasingly featuring in published work (e.g. Sen, 
McClelland & Jowett, 2016) we still agree with Webb’s (2006, p.17) 
statement that “To date there has been no comprehensive modelling 
applying phenomenology to social work” a lack that we are beginning to 
address in order to recognize that we urgently need to theorize questions 
of embodiment, context and embedded meaning, as well as understanding 
the dynamic nature of such formulations. As Lorenz argues: 
 
“New ontologies for social work advocate ‘situated knowledge’ as the 
recognition that knowledge is bounded, embodied, contextual, 
partial, complex and based on engagement and interconnections 
rather than on disembodiment and transcendence” (Walter Lorenz, 
presentation at JSWEC 13th July 2016) 
 
Lorenz’s position calls for a paradigmatic shift in the way social work is 
beginning to orient its ability to understand its work with the people who 
use its services. We accept and extend that position by arguing for a 
phenomenology of social work that has the potential to fully explore the 
ontological issues of situated, embodied lived-experience of service users 
and social workers and has the potential to offer a deeper level of analysis 
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than the merely ontical enquiries offered by other approaches. Social 
Work is unique as a discipline in its potential to understand the totality of 
what it means to have being-in-the-world rather than aspects of being that 
become the focus of other analyses. Historically, there has been a focus 
either on the micro level analysis of psychology, the macro level analysis of 
sociology or syntheses betwixt the two, which are insufficient. For 
example, Corby (2006, p.155) describes three main groups of theoretical 
perspectives to inform an understanding of child protection, which 
‘…derive from different sources, survey the problem at different levels and 
don’t necessarily complement each other’ 
 Psychological theories which focus on the instinctive and 
psychological qualities of those that abuse 
 Social Psychological which focus on the dynamics between 
abuser, child and immediate environment 
 Sociological perspectives which emphasize the social and 
political conditions as the most important reason for the 
abuse 
All of these ontical inquiries, rooted in modernity, attempt to explain from 
an external, rational perspective that lead us down the path of thinking 
that as long as we know the psychological qualities of the adults, the 
external social and economic context and the quality of the relationship 
between the adult and the child then we ought to be able to calculate the 
likelihood of a particular child being harmed by a particular adult, 
completely bypassing human agency ie. the capacity to take responsibility 
for and to make one’s own decisions. One of us has previously argued in a 
preliminary way, that “The quest for certainty so that it ‘. . .  will never 
happen again’ leads us to clutch at performance management straws that 
inevitably give way when it does happen again.” (Smeeton, 2015, p.2) 
 
Three Paradigms for Practice 
Psychology 
 
In order to understand the value of phenomenology for social work it is 
necessary to initially understand the dominant trends of theorizing social 
work. Firstly, there is the psychological approach. We are profoundly wary 
of social workers’ use of psychology in describing the relationships of 
people they work with as they often overlook their own subjective self, 
whilst claiming to objectively explain another subjective self. We agree 
with Husserl’s assertion that: 
 
“By its objectivism psychology simply cannot make a study of the soul 
in its properly essential sense, which is to say, the ego that acts and is 
acted upon.” (The Vienna Lecture, 1935) 
 
The psychological stance is usually one that claims theoretical 
understandings based upon a position that humanity is objectively 
knowable and the application of that knowledge leads us to believe that 
Embodied Social Work Practice within Risk Society 
 
 4 
behaviour in certain situations is predictable, negating to varying degrees 
the capacity for agency. The distinction between phenomenology and 
psychology is important to understand. The common fulcrum of 
phenomenological analysis is that all consciousness is intentional or 
implicitly oriented towards the world (Husserl, 1982). Psychology, on the 
other hand, attempts to account for psychological content – judging, 
thinking, imagining as naturalistic processes. While phenomenology has 
certainly been deployed in the field of psychology, this often remains 
limited to internal subjective experiences of an external world. The task of 
phenomenology is to uncover meanings derived from being-in-the-world 
where no dualism exists between the world and the individual. While 
psychological meaning is obviously important, we argue that it is still 
necessary to supplement this with a phenomenological understanding of 
the lived experience of client and social worker alike. This provides us with 
a theoretical nexus to negotiate the fraught difficulty between 
psychological introspection and social atmosphere.  
 
Sociology 
 
It is important to retain the sense of how social work has been understood 
sociologically, particularly in relation to the concept of risk. Social Work is 
often more comfortable working from a sociological understanding and 
indeed there is a wealth of material in this area that seeks to understand 
the “Risk Society” (Beck, 1992) within which social work is practiced. Webb 
(2006) characterises the current social work paradigm of neo-liberal social 
work as located within the sociological period of late-modernity with its 
focus on risk. 
 
Denney (2005) argues that both Giddens and Beck share a theoretical 
starting point in seeing risk as central to the development of 
postmodern/post-traditional societies, although Giddens prefers the term 
‘late modernity’. Such societies have replaced belief in fate or the will of 
gods with an embracing of the uncertainty of risk. A central feature of late 
modernity is uncertainty about truth claims and scepticism about the 
ability of experts to predict complex risks which increase mass anxiety. 
Denney (2005, p.32) roots risk thinking as built upon the assumptions that 
individuals think of their lives in terms of managing uncertainty and danger 
and not on major structural inequality. This is a significant step away from 
social work’s radical and critical traditions. However, it is Beck who set the 
debate: 
 
“Through risk, the arrogant assumption of controllability – but 
perhaps also the wisdom of uncertainty – can increase in influence” 
(Beck 2007, p.5) 
 
Beck (2007, p.4) describes the two faces of risk as ‘chance and danger’ and 
defines risks as “the probabilities of physical harm due to given 
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technological or other processes” but also a systematic way of dealing with 
hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself. 
His central tenet is that the whole society is infected by a preoccupation 
with risk and that this in fact defines late modernity. We clamour for 
certainty whenever we can get it and are disappointed when experts fail to 
accurately predict or prevent harm. However, he disputes the purported 
rationality of science to be able to investigate the hazardousness of a risk, 
based upon speculative assumptions within a framework of probability 
statements. He also says that in-order to discuss risks meaningfully one 
must assume an ethical position as risk determinations are based upon 
mathematical possibilities and social interests. This leads, he argues, to an 
odd straddling between objective and value dimensions which do not 
assert moral standards openly but in the form of “quantitative, theoretical 
and causal implicit morality.” (Beck, 1992, p.176). Additionally, 
“Statements on risk are the moral statements of scientised society”. 
 
Risk definitions are however a highly effective instrument for steering and 
selecting economic developments. (Beck, 1992, p.227) which explains why 
politicians, in justifying spending cuts, will often commission expert 
reports to offer them the moral statement that will justify their decisions. 
The Munro Report (2010) was such an exercise in the UK to respond to the 
tragic death of Peter Connolly. It served as a thorough moral statement of 
the knowledge base about how risk is dealt with in child protection social 
work and attempted to tackle Luhmann’s (2000 cited in Denney: 2005, 
p.33) position that the rhetoric of public protection is now greater than 
the real risk faced by individuals.  
 
Beck (1992, p.23) acknowledges that some people are more affected than 
others by the distribution of risks due to inequalities of class and strata but 
argues that the ‘boomerang effect’ sooner or later also strikes those who 
produce or profit from them. He goes on to assert that while one can 
possess wealth one can only be afflicted by risks which are ascribed by 
civilisation. Therefore, in cases of class and stratification being determines 
consciousness, while in risk positions, consciousness determines being. 
Knowledge therefore gains a new political significance as well as an 
imperative for philosophical treatment. We will attempt in this work to 
examine these statements in relation to some ideas from Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty. But what is clear from Beck’s work is that “Risk society is a 
catastrophic society. In it the exceptional condition threatens to become 
the norm.” (Beck, 1992, p.24). 
 
Phenomenology 
 
We pose that phenomenology is a comfortable home for social work which 
has as its central concern an understanding of the lived experiences of 
people within their contexts, or, what is often referred to as the person-in-
environment configuration. Essentially, what we are doing in our broader 
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work is firstly, theorising the value of phenomenology for social work. 
Secondly, and more specifically, we are theorising a phenomenology of 
risk as it pertains to social work practice.  The analyses can only remain 
general within the confines of this article. Generally, a phenomenology of 
risk would require the application of the following factors to concrete 
situations in order to more fully theorise social work practice: the 
recognition and differentiation of risk from threat, the embodiment of risk, 
survival as a motivating force, the normalisation of risk as a generic human 
behaviour, the conceptualisation of notions of home and the alien, the 
rejection of ‘absolute security’, and full expansion of resilience and 
vulnerability. While such an undertaking is obviously a bigger project, for 
now it is enough to argue that phenomenology also has to pay attention to 
the fact that humans have care for their being-in-the-world which is 
essentially the fundamental social work pre-occupation. It matters to us 
how people live within society. It is also an important ethical imperative to 
understand people as active agents in their lives and their rights to ascribe 
meaning to their situations and wherever possible to make their own 
decisions – their lives matter to them. Phenomenology offers the 
philosophical roots to support such thinking. 
 
Roche (1973) describes the main ideas of the phenomenological school as: 
 
a) Man’s (sic) basic distinguishing feature is his ability to know that he is 
aware of things: Man can be conscious of being conscious of. 
b) Consciousness is intentional: Every conscious act refers to an object of 
some kind. 
c) Phenomenological description: There is no way of studying the 
conscious activity of the experiencer apart from a study of that which 
he experiences. We have first of all to accurately describe the 
phenomenon. 
d) The transcendental reduction: For existential phenomenologists, this 
amounts to a specific effort to rebut positivism and the natural 
scientific programme. 
e) Natural attitude: Man, in a state of society takes all measure of things 
for granted as real and concrete. 
f) The trajectory of the phenomenological school represents one 
reaction to the growth in explanatory power and the social 
importance given to the natural sciences:  
 
There is a constant tension within many areas of sociology and allied 
professions between positivist and social constructionist understandings of 
social phenomena and the human condition which we believe 
phenomenological description and transcendental reduction allows us to 
sidestep to some degree as: 
 
“Phenomenology does not study the what of our experience but the 
experience of the what – the experience of the intentional object, 
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thing, entity, event as it appears to consciousness.” (Van Manen, 
2014, p.91) 
 
It is less important then, to focus on what service users have experienced 
or are experiencing and more important to understand and value what 
meaning they make of it. Social Work often takes an investigative stance in 
child protection work, trying to uncover the truth of a situation, which is 
often unreachable for our only witnesses to that truth are people who are 
telling us their own accounts of their lives. These are imbued with the 
meaning and value they bring to it. It is their understandings that will 
inform their abilities to survive or thrive and which will inform their future 
actions. When social workers try to impose an external meaning to their 
experiences all we do is devalue those meanings and rob them of agency. 
An important device within phenomenology then is the epoché 
(bracketing) which is a suspension of the naïve belief in the natural 
attitude. The phenomenologist attempts to put the real world of objects, 
instruments, values and people between brackets and to put them ‘out of 
play’ (Roche, 1973). According to Roche, Schutz (1962) described the 
natural attitude as a ‘suspension of doubt’ and the epoché as a ‘suspension 
of belief’.  
 
Use of the epoché allows the social worker to suspend their prior 
assumptions about what might have happened, what might be the barriers 
or oppressions that service users face and what we believe the answers to 
be. This natural standpoint is the point of view that all of us cannot but 
adopt in the course of our everyday lives. The acceptance of certain things 
as real and indubitable in order to live and act in everyday life includes 
social facts as well as physical facts. Bracketing away all these prior 
assumptions and attitudes allows us to privilege the stance of the service 
user and to get a glimpse into their being-in-the-world.  
 
The notion of being-in-the-world plays its most prominent role in the 
thinking of Heidegger (1953) and Merleau-Ponty (2002), which help to 
break with modern divisions that lead to the most difficult problems of a 
philosophy of action. Both philosophers see the human as purposefully 
acting in the world. What Heidegger calls Dasein¸ offers a radical 
rethinking of the human self. Dasein in its most basic sense attempts to 
think of the human as simply there, existing in a world. Dasein is also a 
questioning being and what makes Dasein distinctive is its ability to 
question its own existence, its own projects and its own place in a 
historical world. In addition, Heidegger through the course of Being and 
Time attempts to unveil the different modalities of being human. 
Primarily, Dasein is a temporal being, embedded within a specific history, 
coming from somewhere and going somewhere, at an intersection of past, 
present and future. Because the human is essentially a temporal and 
transient being, this firstly reveals the contingency and specific historicity 
of the human being. Additionally, this contingency reveals further insights 
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for Heidegger, into what makes a human being what they are and can be.  
Because time is the ultimate horizon of our being, it ultimately means that 
we are the beings which pass, and therefore death is of fundamental 
concern. As such, death is a phenomenon of life for Heidegger 
(Kominkiewicz, 2006; Jirasek & Veselesky, 2013). Because death haunts life 
as such, it means that anxiety is also a principle mode of our existing in a 
world. Anxiety ought not necessarily be considered in a purely negative 
sense or as a form of psychological disturbance. Instead, anxiety reveals 
the contingency of being human. Certainly, anxiety reveals the precarious 
nature of life, but it also reveals the possibilities that are open to Dasein. 
Anxiety, for our purposes, reveals the human as a being at risk, and at the 
same time a being with the capacity to confront the different ways risk 
might manifest itself.   
 
Heidegger suggests that in addition to anxiety there a number of 
fundamental moods (Stimmung) which constitute Dasein.  According to 
Heidegger, these moods or atmospheres disclose the world to us as 
meaningful. For example, mood discloses our thrownness (Geworfenheit), 
or the idea that we inhabit a particular environment. Mood discloses 
futural possibilities which we project towards and for which we are 
inherently concerned or have care for (Sorge). All of our fundamental 
moods take place in a social atmosphere, what Heidegger calls 
befindlichkeit (attunement) which is the general precondition for any tasks 
or activities that we carry out.  This is to say, that we find ourselves 
situated or attuned to the world in a way that is meaningful. For our 
purposes, Heidegger’s typology of moods offers us an exceptionally rich 
way of thinking about how social workers interact with the world of 
service users. Being able to have a sense of mood, of the totality of the 
environment of a service user, we argue offers a vital platform through 
which we can gain sense of the ways service users belong to a world. In 
terms of caring and concernful relations that emerge in relation to service 
users this offers an important distinction to psychological and objective 
models. If we consider the moods of the service user not as naturalized or 
objective, i.e. as detached and ‘out there’ in the external world, nor if we 
consider the service user in a subjective psychological sense, as merely 
holding a ‘state-of-mind’ that is there to be fixed, but instead through 
discerning that which is both pre-objective and pre-subjective, namely the 
sense of being part of a world, being alienated from a world, having a 
stake in a world. To think of service users in a dispositional sense, or being-
affected in innumerable ways, will allow the social worker to gain an 
illuminated sense of who they are engaging with, what matters to said 
individuals, as well as a sense of the possibilities that are latent in their 
current situation. (Kominkiewicz, 2006; Jirasek & Veselesky, 2013). 
 
Such an approach we argue considers the service-user neither as an object 
that can be viewed from a detached and neutral point of view, nor as 
someone that is purely self-inaugurated with sole responsibility for their 
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own agency.  Furthermore, the upshot of this method, is that it is also 
enriching for the social worker, who can gain a sophisticated sense of 
various practical meanings and projects available to a service user. Also, 
the social worker can now see they belong to a relatively proximate 
significant world, where there are innumerable practical meanings with 
which to engage the service user, as well as sharing and being practically 
immersed in the various possibilities that lay open. 
 
Ultimately, what phenomenology recognizes is that the social worker also 
is a being-in-the-world and is not a dispassionate actor able to step aside 
and objectively understand the lived experiences of others. Roche (1973, 
p.30) describes Heidegger’s phenomenology as preliminary to ontology 
and, as such, hermeneutic. That is, it has to understand and interpret 
human existence as it is, as ‘Dasein’. The philosopher and social worker 
can only understand phenomena from their own being-in-the-world. 
Stanford (2011, p.1528) similarly argues that we need to question the 
assumptions, feeling and motivations that contribute to the meanings we 
ascribe to these ‘embodied conceptualisations of risk.’ 
 
Embodied Social Work Practice 
 
In addition to the rich register of phenomenological concepts which we 
can take from Heidegger, we also argue that the role of embodiment is an 
essential feature of the relation between social worker and service user.  
Embodiment is a phenomenological concept that has most famously and 
extensively been articulated by Maurice Merleau-Ponty.  The basic idea for 
Merleau-Ponty is that the body is active and dynamic as well as a rich 
repository of meaning. Our lived experience is an embodied one.  
 
Generally, Merleau-Ponty (2002) critiques the dominant philosophical 
trends of what he calls ‘intellectualism’ (rationalism) and empiricism. Both 
provide very limited accounts of how we might understand human beings 
as they exist in the world. Intellectualism, Merleau-Ponty argues, over-
emphasizes the conceptual content of our experience, and empiricism 
over-emphasizes a passive theory of the human being, where the human is 
a passive recipient of external sensory data, and ultimately can be 
understood in a limited naturalistic or behavioural way. Such approaches 
effectively dismember the human being from the world, splitting our 
understanding of lived experience into an objective and subjective one. 
Merleau-Ponty (1964, p.138) says as much: “Our science and our 
philosophy are two faithful and unfaithful offshoots of Cartesianism, two 
monsters born of its dismemberment.” 
 
Instead, Merleau-Ponty wants to theorize an enriched account of 
perceptual experience with the body playing the most significant role. The 
most basic reason for this argument, for Merleau-Ponty, is that on a very 
primordial and visceral level what we are is constituted from space, depth 
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and motility. We cannot be aware, we cannot think, we cannot judge or 
imagine without involving the body. While this may seem obvious, for 
Merleau-Ponty the stake of such an insight is fundamentally overlooked. If 
the human body by necessity takes up space, and has depth, then we must 
do more than simply think of the body as an inert and static object. 
Instead, the body is actively dynamic for Merleau-Ponty. To have 
consciousness, to be aware is to ‘think body’ from start to finish. The body 
is responsive, embedded, a source of historical and sedimented meaning. 
It is not neutral nor abstract. We cannot conceive of the body in an 
abstract or neutral way decoupled from the space and world which it 
inhabits. Thus, to exist is to exist as an embodied being-in-the-world. 
 
As well as taking up space and depth, the body is also characterized by 
motility. For Merleau-Ponty, the body is not passive, instead it is active, 
existing within certain constraints and limitations, but essentially also 
responding and reaching out to the world in which it is enmeshed.  The 
body adapts to the spaces, environments, and different possibilities.  What 
is significant about this for our purposes is that we consider it necessary to 
supplement Heidegger’s analysis of moods with Merleau-Ponty’s analysis 
of embodiment. Incorporating an understanding of embodiment, is vital 
for understanding the roles of both social worker and service user. 
Bringing embodiment into the frame of reference, allows the discourse of 
social work to consider body in its most visceral and existential nature as 
one of possibility, movement as well as habitual disposition. In this way, 
we can account for social work as a visceral phenomenon rather than an 
abstract one, which invariably leads to an enhanced and nuanced account 
of how the relation between social worker and service user is a question of 
engrained embodiment, incorporating pragmatic issues such as fatigue, 
the lived experience of risk, as well as phenomenological questions about 
possibilities of mortality and survival. Hence, it is our position, that a 
phenomenology of survival surrounding issues of life and death, and the 
nature of meaning, are essential to bring to the practice of social work.  
 
Ferguson (2010, p.1108) describes the adventure of social work as 
‘characterised by feelings of excitement, dread, fear, often extreme 
anxiety, thrill and adrenaline rushes’ which are part of the routine 
experience of social work and often referred to as the ‘buzz’. He also 
describes practitioners’ bodies as being physically put at risk as the 
environment itself is used against them, making their job harder and even 
possibly causing them harm. He draws upon Merleau-Ponty’s (2002, 
p.235) description of the body as the very actuality of the phenomenon of 
expression and the greatest instrument of comprehension. Social Workers 
often experience ‘disgust’ at home conditions that produce a direct threat 
to their own physical safety and may not take appropriate action to 
protect children due to this physical experience and the need to find their 
own safety (Ferguson, 2010). He describes a catalogue of threats to the 
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very bodies of social workers but also describes the thrill from feeling that 
you have made a difference to people’s lives and relieved suffering. 
 
“Our own body is in the world as the heart is in the organism: it keeps 
the visible spectacle constantly alive, it breathes life into it and 
sustains it inwardly, and with it forms a system” (Merleau-Ponty, 
2002, p.235) 
 
As we can see, there is no duality in Merleau-Ponty. Here he is saying that 
the individual body isn’t distinct from the outside world but is a 
contributing part of it. Nor is there a duality between mind and body for 
Merleau-Ponty was particularly influenced by Gabriel Marcel’s 
Metaphysical Journal (1927) and especially his claim that I do not so much 
have a body as that “I am my body” (je suis mon corps). (cited in Moran, 
2000, p.406) 
 
Because we are inextricably in the world, Merleau-Ponty argues that we 
are unable to separate it objectively from our experience of it (Merleau-
Ponty, 2002) Therefore “all consciousness is consciousness of something” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p.6). This seats Merleau-Ponty clearly in the 
tradition of Husserl and Heidegger through the clarity that this 
directedness brings to philosophical thought. Recognising that we aren’t a 
free-floating consciousness disconnectedly grappling with understanding 
and meaning, but that we are corporeal beings situated temporally in a 
world that we are involved with, brings purpose. We don’t argue for 
purpose in any teleological sense that we are heading towards any pre-
existing truth but for purpose that our involvement in the world matters. 
This relates back to Heidegger’s point that Dasein has care for the world. 
 
Inherent in this position is a critique of any dualisms of soul/body, 
mind/body, consciousness/body. We would argue that we cannot treat 
the body as an object for consciousness as it is the very interface between 
consciousness and the world and therefore involved in both. Reason does 
not sit on top of physical, sensory experience. “Rationality itself is imbued 
with sensibility and vice versa” (Moran, 2000, p.423). Merleau-Ponty 
extends this discussion by drawing upon Sartre’s account of how the body 
is everywhere in one’s experience of the world. 
 
“That is why my body always extends across the tool which it utilises: 
it is at the end of the cane on which we lean and against the earth, it 
is at the end of the telescope which shows me the stars; it is on the 
chair, in the whole house, for it is my adaptation to these tools.” 
(Sartre, 1958: Being and Nothingness cited in Moran, 2000, p.424) 
 
Merleau-Ponty developed this theme by arguing that we do not just take 
up space, we inhabit it and relate to it “like a hand to an instrument” (cited 
in Moran, 2000, p.424). We see here how Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger 
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separate in thinking about tools. For Heidegger, they were either ‘ready to 
hand’ or ‘present at hand’. For Merleau-Ponty, the hand and the tool form 
an alliance that makes the tool useful or not. The hammer may be the 
right weight to hammer in the nail but if the hand that wields it is too 
heavy or too light problems can emerge. The user requires ‘feel’ and 
dexterity that responds to feeling the responsiveness of the nail. 
 
Similarly, for the use of ‘risk’ in social work. One of us has argued 
previously (Smeeton, 2018) that risk is in itself ‘obstinate’ in the 
Heideggerian sense of the word. It inhibits good practice. However, we 
must also take into account that at the end of that tool is a person, which 
is the social worker wielding it. They ultimately take responsibility for their 
practice and their decision making, how much emphasis they put on which 
‘risk factors’ based on their own embodied knowledge of the world and 
their physical and emotional encounter with the service users with whom 
they are working. Roche (1973, p.28) describes Merleau-Ponty’s concept 
of ‘être au monde’ or ‘being-in-the-midst-of-the-world’ by stating; “Man as 
we know him is the possessor of manual and linguistic skills of which only 
his embodiment as an organic entity, and only his co-existence with other 
persons could make any sense.” Therefore, the social worker is not a 
passive objective machine employing the tools of the state: 
 
“But the system of experience is not arrayed before me as if we were 
a god, it is lived by me from a certain point of view; I am not the 
spectator, I am involved, and it is my involvement in a point of view 
which makes possible both the finite-ness of my perception and its 
opening out upon the complete world as a horizon of perception.” 
(Merleau-Ponty 2002, p.354) 
 
It is the individual social worker who encounters the world of the service 
user and tries to make sense not only of the service user’s meanings but 
their own perceptions. 
 
“We make perception out of things perceived. And since perceived 
things themselves are obviously accessible only through perception, 
we end by understanding neither. We are caught up in the world and 
we do not succeed in extricating ourselves from it in order to achieve 
consciousness of the world. If we did we should see that quality is 
never experienced immediately, and that all consciousness is 
consciousness of something.” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p.5-6) 
 
According to Delancey (2009) Merleau-Ponty’s use of ‘perception’ is 
specifically related to our experience of the world pre-theoretically – that 
is the experience of being-in-the-world. Perception and intentionality, 
Delancey argues, are essentially related to action: we perceive things not 
in terms of simply a construction of sense data but as opportunities for 
action. 
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What we can take from this for the social worker in practice, is that epoché 
offers social workers the ability to suspend (bracket) their beliefs in the 
natural attitude so they aren’t relying on ‘common sense’ but are able to 
see as true a picture of the services users’ lived experience as possible. 
According to Roche (1973) Merleau-Ponty argued that the epoché required 
a flight from natural science’s conception of the world so the 
phenomenology can investigate lived experience which for Merleau-Ponty 
was an investigation of perception or rather the world as perceived. The 
epoché helps us to see the ordinary as strange and in need of some 
explanation. The social worker needs to understand themselves in that 
context too, paying attention to the fears they have, the bodily reactions 
to physical threat and the smells and sounds in the environment as well as 
the brute force of survival in many instances. Using epoché gives space to 
question the natural assumptions that arise and to test out the experience 
of rationality. While philosophy often focuses on rational thought, 
concepts and language, what is ignored according to Merleau-Ponty 
(Moran, 2000, p.418) is the “experience of rationality” arising from the 
“pre-predictive life of consciousness” which is the experience of a being 
with a body, of having a body caught up in risk infused situations along 
with the experience of possibilities within those situations. Here our 
bodies and the specific information of the sense organs reveal the world 
for us in a very special way. His argument here is that our whole 
understanding of the world is grounded in our corporeal nature. We have 
to treat the human subject therefore as an “irresolvable consciousness 
which is wholly present in every one of its manifestations” (Merleau-
Ponty, 2002, p.120) 
 
What we have to do as social workers though is to find meaning in this 
messy, murky milieu where we are trying to strike the balance to enable 
people to make their own free choices and stepping-in in order to protect. 
Merleau-Ponty believes that we need to take human freedom into account 
but believes that freedom is constituted by the way we live and adapt to 
the world of meanings where some of those meanings are already chosen 
for us. He adapts Sartre’s existential statement that “we are condemned 
to be free” (cited in Moran: 2000, p.420) to “we are condemned to 
meaning” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p. xxiii). 
 
Applying these ideas of epoché and embodiment to the social worker’s 
lived experience of child protection practice within risk saturated 
environments, leads us to a discussion about how and why social workers 
continue to practice and the fragility of dasein as a practitioner. We 
postulate that child protection social work has much in common with the 
risk taking of extreme sports. 
 
Social Work as Extreme Sport 
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“The decision-making in skydiving is relatively simple. It is impossible 
to jump a little out of the plane. Either one jumps or one does not. 
And when one has made the jump there is no way back. Skydiving is 
irreversible and one has to make fast decisions. Things happen very 
fast.” (Breivik, 2011, p.325) 
 
Of course, child protection social work is not a sport. It is the interface 
between the state and very vulnerable people who are often living difficult 
lives with complex challenges and few resources. There is no scoring 
system for protecting children (although many of the neo-liberal 
performance management systems might tend in that direction). It is 
certainly not a profession that people enter for fun or to get fit. It is 
probably the antithesis to those goals. So why do social workers do it and 
why do some of them stay in it? The stress levels and burnout rates are 
extremely high (Cooper, 2015). In its evidence to the House of Commons 
Education Select Committee, Cornwall Council wrote:  
 
“The statement that non-defined ‘failure will not be tolerated’ only 
adds to the high anxiety experienced by frontline social workers, 
which in turn leads to defensive practice. Defensive practice only 
serves to reduce the effectiveness of social work. It also adds a barrier 
to recruitment and retention, especially as many operate in fear that 
they will be blamed (and punished) for systemic failings or the failings 
of others.” (6th July 2016) 
 
The problems in retention that follow practice in high anxiety meant that 
in 2015 there was a vacancy rate of 17% and that the average children & 
families social work career in the UK lasts less than eight years compared 
to 16 for a nurse and 25 for a doctor. (Select Committee, 6th July 2016). As 
Littlechild (2008, p.672) successfully argued, “…it is necessary to examine 
the risks of risk assessments” due to their inducement of fearful 
perceptions in social workers concerned about the unrealistic promise that 
risk can be eliminated; that they will be blamed if they get it wrong; and 
from the direct violence or threats of violence from service users. Anxiety 
about mechanistic risk assessment has in fact increased social work fears. 
Smith, Nursten & McMahon (2004) in their extensive study of the effects 
of fear in social workers reported the full range of physiological and 
cognitive effects related to the adrenaline rush of fear, tummy cramps, 
increased heart rate, dry mouth, feeling sick. These fears related to a 
variety of situations from actual attacks and direct threats from service 
users to fear of colleagues’ responses to perceived failures. Their study of 
social workers only included those still in work and is missing accounts 
from those who left the profession due to their anxieties and fears. 
 
Stanford (2010, 2011), in considering how ideas of risk are constituted and 
integrated into social workers interventions, found that risk operated as an 
embodied concept for practitioners and was spoken of as attached to 
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characters rather than contexts. This very useful framework of presenting 
both social workers’ and service users’ ‘risk identities’ as either ‘a risk’ or 
‘at risk’ allows Stanford to form a subtle analysis of social workers’ fears. 
She describes them as fearing negative judgments of their practice, fearing 
physical violence from service users and fearing that they may cause harm 
to clients through being ineffective. The realisation that social workers 
often ascribe themselves and service users simultaneously ‘a risk’ and ‘at 
risk’ identities reveals the complex dynamics of how risk operates, 
particularly when social workers are having to make complex moral 
judgments about which identities they need to prioritise within each 
interaction. Stanford’s study is peppered with examples of how social 
workers recognise risk and overcome their fears in order to selflessly take 
a stand for their clients and to do good. As one of her participants 
illustrates: 
  
“The risk to the client, which to me is the moral consideration, 
overrode the other one, the systematic or personal risk. So to me that 
was the right thing to do. Yes. It just overrode it.” (Stanford, 2010, 
p.1075) 
 
Stanford (2010, p.1077) concludes that risk taking in the face of fear and 
feeling unsafe at work was a common feature of her participants’ accounts 
and that their capacity to act resolutely with purpose as agents of change 
involved taking risks which laid bare their personal and professional 
vulnerabilities. 
 
Ferguson’s (1997, 2010, 2014) extensive and impressive body of work 
about embodied social work practice gives many insights into the lived 
experience of child protection social workers with some nods to Merleau-
Ponty but without ever fully theorizing from that position. However, it is 
interesting that he develops a narrative of child protection social work as 
an ‘adventure’ often referred to as the ‘buzz’” (Ferguson, 2011, p.47). One 
of his participants described getting a high from practice. Ferguson (2011, 
p.48) self-reports about his learning from previous practice with a service 
user who threatened violence as being an ‘…investment in a dangerous 
kind of macho social work, where getting in at any cost…became a kind of 
victory not only for needing to see the children and the home, but 
something to boost my masculine pride”.   
 
We propose that as Ferguson indicated above, there is a ‘buzz’ to child 
protection social work that draws on the adrenalin rush of making very 
difficult, life-changing decisions in an environment of high risk to the self 
and others. Decision making becomes an embodied experience of risk-
taking by professionals. While the decision-making in sky-diving is 
relatively simple the decision-making in child protection social work is not. 
There are lots of complex, dynamic factors to take into account. However, 
once decisions are made and actions taken, they can’t be unmade. At the 
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extreme end one either takes a child away from its parents or leaves them 
at home. On very rare occasions when children are left at home they may 
die at the hands of their carers, as with Victoria Climbie or Peter Connolly. 
The social work decision in that situation is completely irreversible and the 
consequences terrible for all. If one takes a child away, there may be 
points within the early stages that parents can be helped to change things 
around and the child returned to their care. However, the separation has 
long lasting effects on all concerned. We cannot go back to a position 
where that decision was never made. It will cause an evanescent chain 
that will change the way that the child, the birth parents and the social 
worker perceive the world. If the child is placed for adoption the decision 
again is irreversible. The child cannot go back. These decisions do not 
usually have to be taken immediately but they are life changing. Once one 
has decided to jump one cannot jump a little. There is no 
phenomenological literature relating to this, but there is one relating to 
the similarly adrenalin fuelled activities involved in extreme sports such as 
snowboarding (Loland, 2007), and even more risk sports where the 
extreme situation of facing danger and possible death makes deep 
existential structures visible in a peculiar and salient way (Jirasek, 2007; 
Breivik, 2010). The phenomenology of risk sport places the main aspect of 
risk in the specific interaction between person, activity and arena, which 
mirrors the descriptions of social work made by Ferguson above. 
 
In his discussion of risk sport, Brymer (2010) argues that risk is a culturally 
constructed phenomenon stemming from modern society’s deep-seated 
aversion for, and obsessive desire to be ‘liberated’ from, uncertainty. Risk, 
he argues, was initially a construct used to understand outcome 
probability and magnitude in gambling but as modern society has become 
fixated with safety, risk has gradually become a negative descriptor 
synonymous with the unacceptable face of danger and society’s primary 
preoccupation about ‘rendering it measurable and controllable’. 
Government policy has become so preoccupied with risk reduction that 
activities not immediately accepted by the majority are instantly labelled 
undesirable. Risk sports face this stigma…and so does social work. 
 
“Our evidence suggested the fear of blame within children and 
families social work is counter-productive to the retention of social 
workers”. (Select Committee, 6th July 2016) 
 
 
Conclusions. 
 
We have argued that there is a fight for social work’s knowledge base 
between the micro level of psychology and the macro level of sociology 
that has pulled social work’s focus away from our interactions with our 
service users. We have therefore argued as per Heidegger that we should 
regard psychology and sociology as secondary phenomena, particular  
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ways of being, derivative from and irretrievably dependent upon other, 
more everyday ways of being. The battle ground for this fight has been the 
‘risk society’ so we have explored how that pre-occupation with risk and 
search for certainty has tried to lull us into dependence upon disembodied 
practice rooted in objective ways of knowing. 
 
We have therefore tried to work through how embodiment changes social 
work practice towards a risk fuelled profession dealing with high levels of 
anxiety and burn out rates more akin to a risk sport than measured, caring 
interventions aimed towards supporting families. We have argued that 
phenomenology may provide a useful framework for understanding not 
only the lived experiences of service users but also embodied social work 
practice and the ways that fear and anxiety can impact upon decision-
making in child protection contexts. 
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